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Abstract 
This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain 
inputs in the framework of possibility theory. 
Revision can be based on two possible definitions 
of the conditioning operation, one based on min 
operator which requires a purely ordinal scale only , 
and another based on product, for which a richer 
structure is needed, and which is a particular case of 
Dempster's rule of conditioning . Besides, revision 
under uncertain inputs can be understood in two 
different ways depending on whether the input is 
vie wed, or not, as a constraint to enforce. 
Moreover, it is shown that M.A. Williams' 
transmutations, originally defined in the setting of 
S pohn 's functions, can be captured in this 
framework, as well as Boutilier's natural revision. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Belief revision in the sense of Giirdenfors (1988) is 
founded upon the existence of an epistemic entrenchment 
relation which rank-orders the formulas in a belief base to 
be revised. It has been pointed out that this epistemic 
entrenchment is nothing but a qualitative necessity 
measure and that faithful extensions of Gii.rdenfors' notions 
of expansion, contraction and revision can be defined in 
the framework of possibility theory and possibilistic 
logic; see (Dubois and Prade, 1992). In this setting, belief 
change can be either discussed in terms of a possibility 
distribution defined on the possible worlds (as in 
probability theory), or in terms of a possibilistic logic 
knowledge base (made of classical propositional formulas 
weighted by lower bounds of necessity measures) from 
which a possibility distribution can be defined. 
Indeed, a layered consistent, propositional, belief base 
induces an ordering on the set of interpretations. Each 
layer may be interpreted as a level of certainty or as a 
specificity ranking in case of conditional knowledge (such 
as Z-ranking in the sense of Pearl (1990)). From such an 
ordering, encoded here as a possibility distribution 1t, a 
necessity measure N can be defined which enables us to 
recover the layer to which a formula belongs. More 
generally, an inference mechanism which propagates the 
certainty levels in agreement with the semantics pro vided 
through the underlying possibility distribution has been 
defined in the framework of possibilistic logic (Dubois et 
a!., 1994). With this view in mind revising a layered 
knowledge base by the introduction of a new piece of 
information turns to be equivalent to some conditioning 
of the associated possibility distribution, while we remain 
in agreement with AGM postulates for revision 
(Gii.rdenfors, 1988). Moreover, any possibility distribution 
1t leads to a belief set (i.e., a deductively closed set of 
logical formula) K = {pI N([p]) > 0}, where [p] denotes 
the set of models of proposition p, and the revised belief 
set by proposition q, K* q is nothing but {pI N([p] I [q]) > 
0}. In such a revision the input q is understood as a 
constraint expressing that q should be fully certain in the 
revised belief set, indeed N([q] I [q]) = 1. Following 
Boutilier (1993), we can consider that the input is only 
asserting that q should belong to the revised belief set, 
i.e., that in terms of a revised necessity measure N* q we 
only require N* q( [q]) > 0; this is called natural revision by 
Boutilier (who does not consider a revision process such 
that N* q([q]) = 1). 
It is shown in the paper that natural revision is equivalent 
to several revisions under uncertain inputs in the 
possibilistic setting. Moreover, possibilistic revision 
under uncertain inputs, as discussed in Dubois and Prade 
(1993), is shown to exactly coincide with M.A. Wiiiiams' 
notion of adjustment. More generally, a unified view is 
provided, of various approaches developed by Boutilier 
(1993 ), Boutilier and Goldszmidt ( 1993 ) , Williams 
(1994a, b; 1995), Goldszmidt and Pearl (1992), Darwiche 
and Pearl ( 1994 ). These works display two types of 
conditioning, that can be expressed in possibility theory, 
one (based on minimum operation) which is purely 
ordinal and is at work in Williams' adjustments for 
instance, and another (based on product, thus requiring a 
richer scale) alike Dempster's rule of conditioning, which 
is equivalent to Spohn (1988) conditioning through a 
rescaling and is used by Pearl and his coauthors. It is 
pointed out that belief revision with uncertain inputs can 
be expressed in terms of mixtures: convex sum/product 
mixtures in the probabilistic setting, and max-min or 
max-product mixtures in the possibilistic setting. Dubois 
et a!. (1993) have introduced the qualitative counterpart of 
convex mixtures that also underlie qualitative decision 
theory (Dubois and Prade, 1995). We start by briefly 
recalling how belief change under uncertain inputs is dealt 
with in the probabilistic setting. 
2 PROBABILISTIC SETTING 
The Bayesian setting has been extended to the case of 
uncertain inputs under the form of a partition {A1, A2, 
... , An} of n, and the probability attached to each A1 is 
ai. The result of the revision is then (with Ia1 = 1 and 
P(A1) > 0) 
P(B I {(Ai,ai)}j=1,n)=Li=l,naiP(B I Ai) (1) 
It extends Jeffrey's rule: 
P(B I (A,a)) = aP(B I A)+ (I -a)P(B I A) (2) 
The revision rules ( 1) and (2) have been justified by P.M. 
Williams (1980) on the basis of minimizing the 
informational distance I(P,P') under the constraints P'(A1)= 
ai for i = 1 ,n. ( 1) can also be justified at the formal level 
by the fact that the only way of combining the conditional 
probabilities P(B I A1) in an eventwise manner (i. e. , using 
the same combination law for all events B) is to use a 
linear weighted combination such as ( 1) (Lehrer and 
Wagner, 1981 ). Note that the uncertain input is really 
viewed as a constraint that forces the probability measure 
to bear certain values on a partition of Q. The input 
assigns new probability values to some propositions Pi 
with [pj] = Ai in a partition of n. Jeffrey's rule ensures 
that probabilities do not change in relative value for 
situations within each partition element Ai. 
In the above approach, the coefficient ai is interpreted as 
the sure claim that the probability of input A1 is a1; and 
leads to a correction of the prior probability. Especially it 
is a genuine revision process since the a priori probability 
and the input are at the same level, for instance they are 
both generic knowledge. However, consider the case where 
the input { (A1,a1) }j=1,n means that an event has occurred 
that informs about the current situation, and ai is the 
probability that this particular event is Ai. The input is 
really a piece of uncertain evidence and (I) is then the 
expected value of the conditional probability P(B I A) 
where A is a random event whose realizations belong to 
the partition {A 1, ... , An}. This random event A is then a 
genuine unreliable observation, ai being the probability 
that Ai is the true input (and not the true probability of 
Ai). In other words, the coefficients represent a complete 
probability assignment on the family of subsets 2n, and 
ai = P'( { Aj}) while in Jeffrey's rule, { (Ai,ai) }j=1 n is an 
incompletely described probability measure P' on' Q and 
ai = P'(Aj). It may look strange that the two views, 
corresponding to a revision and an uncertain focusing 
respectively, coincide in their implementation. However 
the requirement that {A 1, ... , An} forms a partition does 
not look compulsory when the input is viewed as an 
uncertain (random) observation rather than a constraint on 
probability values (since it must just be a probability 
assignment on 2°). The partition is compulsory only 
when the uncertain input is a constraint in order to ensure 
that the result obeys the constraint P(Ai I { (A1,ai), i = 
I ,n}) = ai (since Li= 1 ,n ai = 1 ). The uncertain input 
(A,a) interpreted as "event A has probably been observed 
(but maybe nothing has been observed)", corresponds to 
the probability assignment {(A, a), (Q, 1 -a)} and not 
{ (A,a), (A, I - a)} as for Jeffrey's rule. Indeed P( {A}) = 
a does not imply that P( {A})= I -a. 
Belief Revision in the Possibilistic Setting 237 
3 POSSIBILISTIC SETTING 
3. 1 Basic Notions 
The possibilistic approach consists in a slight 
improvement of the pure logical setting from the point of 
view of expressiveness. Instead of viewing a belief state as 
a flat set of mutually exclusive situations, one adds a 
complete partial ordering on top, according to which some 
situations are considered as more plausible than others. A 
cognitive state can then be modelled by a possibility 
distribution 1t, that is, a mapping from n to a totally 
ordered set V containing a greatest element (denoted 1) and 
a least element (denoted 0), typically the unit interval V = 
[0, 1]. However any finite, or infinite and bounded, chain 
will do as well. The advantage of using the plausibility 
scale V is that it makes it easier to compare cognitive 
states. The idea of representing a cognitive state via a 
plausibility ordering on a set of situations ("possible 
worlds") is also pointed out by Grove ( 1986) and 
systematically used by Boutilier in his works (e.g. , 
Boutilier, 1993). 
Similarly to the probabilistic case, a possibility 
distribution generates a set function IT called a possibility 
measure (Zadeh, 1978) defined by (for simplicity V = 
[0,1]) 
IJ(A) = max(l)E A rc(w) (3) 
and satisfying I1(A u B) = m ax(I1(A),I1(B) ) as a basic 
axiom. The degree of certainty of A is measured by means 
of the dual necessity function N(A) = I -ITC A). 
The idea of revision is to get a consistent cognitive state 
even if the input information contradicts the a priori 
cognitive state. Revision in possibility theory is 
performed by means of a conditioning device similar to 
the probabilistic one, obeying an equation (a Ia Cox): 
VB, IT(A II B)= ITCB I A) * IT(A). (4) 
that is similar to Bayesian conditioning, together with 
N(B I A) = 1 - IJ( B I A). Possible choices for * are min 
and the product (the latter makes sense only in the 
numerical settings). However, for * =min this equation 
may have more than one solution ITCB I A). The least 
specific solution to (4) is chosen, (i.e., the solution with 
the greatest possibility degrees in agreement with the 
constraint (4)). The possibility distribution underlying the 
conditional possibility measure fl(-I A) is defined by 
1t(W I A) = 1 if 1t(W) = I1(A), (!) E A, 
rc(w I A) = 0 if ro rt: A, 
= rc(w) if rc(ro) < IT(A), wE A. (5) 
Note that the existence of situations ro such that rc(w) = 
I1(A) is no longer guaranteed in the infinite case, and is 
generally added as an extra condition to the possibility 
distribution; it is referred to in the literature in terms of 
well-ranked orderings, and leads to adding specific 
postulates for revision (Williams, 1994a). Moreover, 
viewed as belief sets, i.e., deductively closed sets of 
logical formulae, based on a language whose 
interpretations form the set n. any possibility distribution 
1t leads to a belief set K = {p, such that N([p]) > 0} 
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(whose models are the core of 1t) and it is not difficult to 
check that the revised belief set K* q using as input the 
formula q whose models form the set lq] =A is K* q = {p, 
such that N([p] I A) > 0 }(whose set of models is { m, 1t(m) 
= Il(A)} whenever Il(A) > 0. This remark (also made by 
Williams, 1994b) points out that while the AGM theory 
revises belief sets, the possibilistic revision also revises 
the epistemic ordering of situations. Clearly iterated 
revision then becomes possible. 
The above discussion of conditional possibility, using *= 
min, makes sense in a purely qualitative setting. In a 
quantitative setting, * = product may sound more 
reasonable and the expression corresponding to (4) is 
VB, Il(B I A) = Il(A n B) (6) 
Il(A) 
provided that Il(A) ::F 0. This is formally Dempster rule of 
conditioning, specialized to possibility measures, i.e., 
consonant plausibility measures in the sense of Shafer. 
The corresponding revised possibility distribution is 
1t(Ol l A)= 1t(Ol), \1 <0 E A; 1t(Oll A)= 0 otherwise. (7) 
Il(A) 
Note that for both (5) and (7), N(A) = 1 � 1t(-I A) = 1t 
(no revision takes place when the input information is 
already known with certainty). It can be shown (Dubois 
and Prade, 1992) that if 1t* A denotes a possibility 
distribution obtained by revising 1t with input A according 
to the AGM postulates, it makes sense to let 1t* A = 
1t( · I A) since counterparts of the AGM postulates for 
revision hold as well with the two definitions. Note that if 
A and B are not disjoint, it can be verified that 1t(· (I A) I 
B) = 1t(- I An B) when iterating the revisions. However if 
An B = 0 then 1t(· (I A) I B) is undefined. 
Moreover (5) embodies a principle of minimal change in 
the sense of the Hamming distance between 1t and 1t' 
defined by H(1t,1t') = Lwe n l1t(Ol)- 1t'(m)l (Q finite). It 
makes sense for a finite totally ordered possibility scale V, 
just mapping the levels to integers. H(1t; 7t(· I A)) is 
minimal under the constraint N(A I A)= I as long as there 
is a single situation mA where 1t(<OA) = Il(A) (Dubois and 
Prade, 1992). When there is more than one situation m 
where 1t(Ol) = Il(A), the principle of minimal change leads 
to as many revision functions by selecting one situation 
m A where 1t( <0 A) = Il(A) and letting 1t* A ( m A) = I and 
1t* A ( w A) = Il(A) for other most possible situations in A. 
In that case 1t(· I A) is the envelope of these minimal 
change revisions. A minimal change information-theoretic 
justification for the numerical, product-based conditioning 
rule exists in terms of relative levels of plausibility. 
The contraction of a possibility distribution with respect 
to A� Q corresponds to forgetting that A is true if A was 
known to be tr��· _
The result 1t:t. of the contract�on must 
lead t� a pOSSibility measure II-A such that n A (A) = 
!"J�( A) = 1, _!:e., complete ignorance about A. Intuitively 
1f ll(A) = fl( A) = 1 already, then we should have 1t-A = 
1t. Besides if Il(A) = I > Il( A) then we should have 
1t-A ( w )= 1 for some m in A, and especially for those <0 
such that Il(A.) = 1t(Ol). It leads to (Dubois and Prade, 
1992) 
1t
-A(W) = 1 if 1t(W) = fl(A), OlE A 
= 1t(Ol) otherwise. (8) 
By construction, 1t-A again corresponds to the idea of 
minimally changing 1t so as to forget A, when there is a 
unique me A such that 1 > Il(A) = 1t(Ol). When there are 
several elements in { m q; A, 1t( m) = IT(A)}, minimal 
change contractions correspond to letting 1t-A(m) = 1 for 
any selection of such situation, and 1t-A corresponds to 
considering the envelope of the minimal change solutions. 
If Il( A) = 0, what is obtained is the full meet contraction 
(Gardenfors, 1988). This contraction coincides exactly 
with a natural contraction in the sense of Boutilier and 
Goldzsmidt (1993). 
3. 2 Uncertain Inputs 
An uncertain input information (A,a) is not understood in 
the same way whether it is a constraint or an unreliable 
input. In the first case, it forces the revised cognitive state 
to satisfy N'(A) =a (i.e., Il'CA) = 1 and Il'(A) = 1 - a) 
and the following belief change Jeffrey-like rule respects 
these constraints 
1t(ml (A,a)) = max(1t(w I A), (I -a) * 1t(ml A)) (9) 
where *= min or product according to whether 1t(W I A) is 
the ordinal or Bayesian-like revised possibility distri­
bution. Note that when a = 1, 1t(<0 I (A,o.)) = 1t(ro I A), 
but when a = 0, we obtain a possibility distribution less 
specific than 1t, such that N(A) = N(A) = 0. 
When o. > 0 and * = min, rule (9) exactly coincides with 
what Williams ( 1994b) calls an "adjustment" (see 
Subsection 3.4 below): the most plausible worlds in A 
become fully plausible, the most plausible situations in A 
are forced to level I - o. and all situations that were 
originally more plausible than 1 - o., if any are forced to 
level I - o. as well. This operation minimizes changes of 
the possibility levels of situations so as to accommodate 
the constraint N'(A) = o.. Williams (1994b) points out 
that for adjustments, if an event B is such that N(B) > 
max(N(A), N(A.), a), then N'(B) = N(B I (A,o.)) = N(B). In 
other words, firmly entrenched beliefs are left untouched. 
Rule (9) can be extended to a set of input constraints 
Il(Ai) = "-i• i = l ,n, where {Ai , i = l,n} forms a partition 
of Q, such that maxi=l n "-i = 1 (normalisation). It gives 
the following rule where * = minimum or product whether 
1t(Oll Ai) is ordinal or numerical: 
1t(ml {{Ai,A.i)}) =maxi A.i * 1t(Oll Ai). (10) 
In the second case (A,o.) is viewed as an unreliable input, 
represented by the weighted nested pair of subsets F = 
{(A, 1), (Q, I - o.)} where the weights denote degrees of 
possibility. The revised cognitive state 1t(· I F) is defined 
by formal analogy with a probabilistic mixture as 
1t(W I F)= max(1t(ro I A), 1t(Ol) * (I -a)). (11) 
Note the difference with (9): there is no conditioning on A 
(1t(Ol) = 1t(Ol I Q)). However, contrary to (9), the equality 
N(A I F) = o. is not warranted since N(A I F) = N(A) 
whenever N(A) > o. . Lastly, 1t(<0 I F)= 1t(<O) if a = 0 
since then F = n: no revision takes place. This behavior 
is very different from the case when the uncertain input is 
taken as a constraint. 
Belief revision rule (9) has been proposed by Spohn 
(1988), using an ordinal conditional function K valued on 
the set � of natural integers such that v A � n, K(A) = 
min { K( ro) I ro E A} and K( ro) can be viewed as a degree of 
impossibility of(!), Letting DK'(A) = 1 - NK'(A) = z-K'(A), 
it is easy to check that 7tK(ro) is equal to 2-K"(ro), where 
7tK is the possibility distribution associated with nK'. 
Spohn (1988) defines two conditioning concepts: 
- V ffi E A, K(ffi I A) = K(ffi)- K(A) 
- the (A,n)-conditionalization of K (conditioning by an 
uncertain input K'(A) = n) 
K(ffi I (A,n)) = K(ffi I A) if roE A; 
K:(ro I (A,n)) = n + K(ffi I A) if roE A. 
whose possibilistic counterparts are equations (7) and (9) 
with * =product: 
1t (ro I A) = 7tK'(ro) if roE A; 1t (ro I A)= 0 otherwise; K' n�A) 1( 
1t (ro I (A,n)) = 1tK(ro) if roE A; K 
DKCA) 
7tK(ro I (A,n)) = (1- a)· 7tK'(ffi) if ffi !e A. 
ilK( A) 
With a= 1 - z-n. The counterpart of (9) can be extended 
to an input ordinal conditional function K:' defined on the 
partition {A1, . . . , An}: lC(ffi I K') = K'(Aj) + K(ffi I Aj). 
V ro E Ai, i = I ,n. This rule can be exactly mapped to the 
possibilistic belief change rule (10) where*= product and 
"-i = 2-K''(
A
i). 
3. 3 Boutilier's Natural Revision 
Possibilistic conditioning is also coherent with Boutilier 
(1993)'s natural revisions. A natural revision by input A 
comes down to only assign to the most plausible 
situations in A a degree of possibility higher that other 
situations while retaining the same ordering of situations 
as before revision, including for situations outside A. This 
means that, after revision, some situations where A is not 
true may remain more plausible than situations where A 
is true. This feature does not fit the idea of revision via 
conditioning whereby, in the revised state, situations 
where the input information is false are deemed 
impossible (as is the case with probabilistic revision). 
The success postulate N(A I A) = 1 used in possibilistic 
revision is very strong, in accordance to the one in 
conditional probability (P(A I A) = 1 ). In Boutilier 
( 1993 )'s work an input A is not taken as definitely true 
but is only supposed to be accepted in the sense that in 
the revised state, only the condition N* nat A (A) > 0 holds 
for his so-called natural revision (where N* nat A encodes 
the result of this revision). In the case of Boutilier 
(l993)'s natural revision, only the set of most plausible 
worlds in A are moved to become the overall most 
plausible states and is this sense it is still a minimal 
Belief Revision in the Possibilistic Setting 239 
change revision. To describe this elementary change in 
possibilistic terms requires the use of non-normalized 
possibility distributions (so that 0( A) > il(A), and 
D*nat A(A) =_il(A) is always allowed, while O*nat A(A)= 
I > 11* nat A( A)). 
The enforced input N(A) > 0 can also be understood as 
"N(A) = I or N(A) =an or ... or N(A) == a2" with scale V 
be made of n + I levels A.1 = I > A.2 > ... > An > 0, and 
ai = 1 - A,i· It suggests that the natural revision can be 
expressed by a series of adjustments n(ro I (A,ai)) 
considering their disjunction: 
n* nat A(ro) = maxi=2, n+l 7t(ffi l (A,aj)) _ 
= max(n(ro I A), (1 - a2) * n(ro I A)). 
This rule coincides indeed with natural revision provided 
* = min and that no situation ffi E A has a priori 
plausibility level 7t(ffi) = A.2, so that when il(A) < 1, 
D*natA(A) = "-2 > 7t(ffi) for all ro such that n(ro) < 1. 
Then natural revision comes down to raising the 
plausibility of the most plausible situations in A to 1 and 
forcing the most plausible situations in A down to Az if 
they had plausibility 1 previously. If 1t( ro) = Az for 
situations ro E A, it is always possible to let 
D*natA(A) =A' were 1 > A' >  "-2 if Vis infinite (= 
[0,1]). For*= product this rule is found in Darwiche and 
Pearl (1994) under the name R-conditioning. 
3.4 M.A. Williams' Approach 
Williams ( 1994b) has defined a general form of belief 
change she calls "transmutations", in the setting of 
Spohn's functions. Given an uncertain input (A,n) taken 
as a constraint and a Spohn function K describing the 
agent's a priori cognitive state, a transmutation of K by 
(A,n) produces a Spohn function K:' such that K'(A) = n 
and K:'(A) = 0, i.e. , the degree of acceptance of A is 
enforced to level n. Clearly, this notion makes sense in 
the possibilistic setting, where a transmutation of a 
cognitive state 1t into n' using input N'(A) = a 
corresponds to enforcing N'(A) = a and N'( A) = 0. 
Williams (1994a) has introduced a more qualitative 
transmutation called an adjustment. An adjustment of K: 
by (A,n) is either a contraction K'-A if n = 0 or another 
belief change operation, defined as follows: 
K* (A,n) = r A if n = 0 _ 
K* (A,n� = 
(K-A}\A,n) if 0 < n. < K( A) K: (A,n) = Kx(A,n) otherw1se 
where K:-A ( ro) = 0 if ro E A and K:( ro) = K:( A) 
r A(ro) = K(ro) otherwise 
K:x(A,n)(ro) = 0 if ffi E A and K(ffi) = K:(A) 
= K(A) if either ffi E A and K(ffi) 7:- K:(A) 
or ffi E A and K(ffi) > n 
= n otherwise. 
In order to clarify the meaning of this intricate definition 
of adjustment, let us map it to the possibilistic setting 
(with a = I - 2-n). It can be shown (see Appendix) that 
the result of this translation is precisely 
n*(A,o:)(ro) = max(n(ro I A), min( l -a, n(ro l A))) 
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where we recognize (9). This result leads us to 
simplifying Williams' adjustment as follows 
K*(A,n/OJ) = min(K*(m I A), max(n, K*(m I A)) (12) 
where K*(m I A) = +oo if m � A; K*(OJ I A)= K(m) if 
K(OJ) > K(A); K*(m I A)= 0 if K(m) = K(A). K*(m I A) is 
the Spohnian version of the qualitative form of 
possibilistic conditioning. 
4 SYNTACTIC REVISIONS OF 
POSSIBILISTIC BELIEF BASES 
Revision tools developed at the semantic level can be 
expressed at the level of a knowledge base expressed in a 
possibilistic logic (Dubois, Lang and Prade, 1994 ). 
4. 1 Possibilistic Logic 
Possibilistic logic syntax consists of sentences in the first 
order calculus to which are attached lower bounds on the 
degree of necessity (or possibility) of these sentences. In 
this section, degrees of uncertainty belong to a totally 
ordered set V with bottom 0 and top I. Here we consider 
only the fragment of possibilistic logic with propositional 
sentences to which lower bounds of degrees of necessity 
are attached. If p is a propositional sentence, (p o:) is the 
syntactic counterpart of the semantic constraint N([p]) � 
0:. 
A possibilistic belief base is a finite set � = {(Pi o:i), 
i=l,n} of weighted (propositional} formulae that contain 
beliefs explicitly held by an agent. The weight indicates 
the agent's confidence in the corresponding formula. Note 
that any belief base ffi (i.e., set of propositional 
sentences) equipped with a complete partial ordering� can 
be mapped to a possibilistic belief base, changing p and q 
in ffi into (p o:) and (q �) such that o: �� if and only if p 
� q. As already pointed out the unit interval could be 
changed into any bounded, totally ordered set; the 
possibility/necessity duality is then expressed by reversing 
the ordering. 
Reasoning in possibilistic logic is done by means of an 
extension of the resolution principle to weighted clauses: 
(co:); (c' �) f-- (Res(c,c') min(o:,�)) 
where c and c' are propositional clauses, and Res(c,c') is 
their resolvent. For instance, (-.p v q o:); (p v r �) f-­
(q v r min(o:,�)). This inference rule presupposes that 
when in a possibilistic formula (p o:) p is not in a clausal 
form, it can be turned into a set { ( ci o: ), i = 1 ,n} of 
weighted clauses such that p is equivalent to c1 1\ c2 /\ . . .  
1\ en. This is justified by the semantics of propositional 
logic, and by the fact that N(p) � o: is equivalent to 
N(ci) � o:,  for i = l,n (from now on, we write N(p) 
instead of N([p]) for short). Inference from a possibilistic 
belief base is denoted � f-- (p o:), and is short for � u 
{ (-.p 1)} f-- (.l a) (refutation method). � f-- (.l a) can be 
checked by means of repeated uses of the resolution 
principle until the empty clause is attained, with some 
positive weight. The degree of inconsistency inc(�) is 
then defined by max { 0: I � f-- (.l o:)}. 
The set of possible situations in which a possibilistic 
logic sentence (p a) is true is a fuzzy set [p a] on n 
defined by 
ll[pa]Cm) = 1 if mE [p] 
= l - o: otherwise, 
where [p] is the set of possible situations where p is true; 
llJp a] is the least specific (i.e., the greatest) possibility distriBution 1t such that N([p]) = infro¢ [p] I - 1t(m) �a. 
A possibilistic belief base � = {(Pi ai), i = 1 ,m} (with 
the semantics N([pj]) :<:: o:i) is represented by the 
possibility distribution 
1t(OJ) = mini=l,m max(!l[pil(m), 1- ai) (13) 
which extends [ �] = [p j] n [p2] n . . . n [Pnl from a set 
of sentences to a set of weighted sentences. 1t is the least 
specific possibility distribution such that 'r:f (p o:) e �. 
N(p) � a, where N is computed with 1t. Semantic 
entailment is defined in terms of specificity ordering 
(1t :<:;; 1t'). Namely, � F= (p o:) if and only if 1t � 
max(ll[pl • l - o:). This notion of semantic entailment is 
exactly the one of Zadeh (1979). Note that the above 
framework can be equivalently expressed in terms of 
Spohnian functions. Instead of using weights in the unit 
interval, we can use integers from 0 to n where n is the 
number of layers in the ordered belief base. An obvious 
understanding of p being in layer i is that K( -.p) � i, 
which can be made equivalent to N(p) � a, where 
i = -Log2(t - o:). The most entrenched sentences are then 
in layer n (see for instance Williams, 1995). The 
minimally specific possibility distribution 1t that is 
induced by an ordered belief base is then changed into a 
ranking of the possible words, namely, letting k' (Pi) the 
layer number of Pi 
x.:(m) = 0 if m satisfies all Pi's in � 
=maxi:� 'Pi k' (Pi) otherwise. 
This is called "minimal ranking function" by Pearl (1990) 
and it corresponds to the minimally specific possibility 
distribution 1t. 
Possibilistic logic is sound and complete with respect to 
refutation based on resolution (Dubois et al., 1994 ). 
Namely, it can be checked that 
inc(�) = 1 - y = 1 - max E Q 1t( m) 
� f-- (p a) if and only if � F= (p a). 
When inc(�) < 1, � is said to be partially inconsistent; 
when inc(� ) = 0 it is completely inconsistent. 
Consistent possibilistic belief bases are such that 1t(m) = 
1 for some (J) E n. Consistency of � is equivalent to 
the consistency of the classical knowledge base � * 
obtained by removing the weights. 
When � is consistent, we can define an ordered belief set 
generated by � as Cons(�) = { (p a), � f-- (p o:)}. The 
set function N such that N([p]) = a for all (p o:) in 
Cons(�) (and 0 otherwise) is a necessity measure. The 
ordering �N generated on Cons(�) is (up to some limit 
conditions) an epistemic entrenchment ordering in the 
sense of Giirdenfors (1988) and an expectation ordering in 
the sense of Gardenfors and Makinson (1994); see Dubois 
and Prade ( 1991 ). Note that the restriction to % of the 
ordering on Cons(%) may fail to respect the original 
ordering on %. Indeed the restriction of a generated 
ordered belief set to a belief set % satisfies the so-called 
EE-coherence property: 
For any (p a) E % and any subset ffi = {(p1 �1), 
i = l,m} of%, 
if ffi t- (p a) then it does not hold that a < 
mini= 1 ,m l3i· 
The above condition is requested by Rescher (1976) and 
Rott ( 1991 ). The restriction of an epistemic entrenchment 
ordering to a belief base is called "ensconcement" by 
Williams (1994a). Starting with any ordering on a belief 
base, possibilistic inference restores the above condition 
on it. 
When � is partially inconsistent, i.e., inc(�) > 0, non­
trivial deductions can still be made from �. namely all 
(p a) such that � t- (p a), and for which a> inc(�). 
Indeed (p a) is then the consequence of a consistent 
subpart of �. Non-trivial inference of p from � is 
denoted � 1- pref p. When % is partially (but not 
totally) inconsistent, the associated consistent ordered 
belief set is ConsprerC �) = { (p a), � t-pref P}. 
In that case max00e n 1t( w) = I - in£(�) < I and '17' p, 
min(N(p),N(-,p)) = inc(� ). Let 1t be a possibility 
distribution on Q defined by 
it(w) = 1t(W) if 1t(W) < I -inc(�) 
= I otherwise 
then it is easy to verify that the necessity measures N and 
N based on 1t (defined by (13)) and it respectively are 
related by the following relation 
N(p) > N(..,p) ==> N(p) = N(p) > N(•p) 
=inc(�)> N(-,p) = 0. 
In fact, we have that 
it(w) = mini:aj>inc(::K) max(ll[pj](w), 1-aj). 
4. 2 Revising Ordered Belief Bases 
Belief change in possibilistic logic can then be envisaged 
as the syntactic counterpart of change for possibility 
distributions. Let � be a consistent set of possibilistic 
formulae. Expansion of � by p consists of forming 
� u { (p I)}, provided that inc(� u { (p l)}) = 0. 
Clearly, the possibility distribution 1t' that restricts the 
fuzzy set of situations that satisfy � u { (p 1)} is 1t' = 
min(It, ll[p]). 
Let us consider the case when � is consistent, but �' = 
� u {(pI)} is not, and let a= inc(� u {(p 1)}) > 0. 
The following identity is easy to prove (e.g., Dubois et 
a!., 1994): 
� u { (p I)} t-rref (q �) if and only ifN(q I p) > 0 
where N(q I p) is the necessity measure induced from 
7t(· I [p]), i.e., the possibility distribution expressing the 
content of �.revised with respect to the set of models of 
p. Indeed let n' be the possibility distribution on Q 
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induced by%', then 
1t' = min(n, ll[R]) 0 < max00en n'(w) =I-a< I 
and the possibility distribution it' induced from the 
consistent part of �· made of sentences whose weight is 
higher than a, is defined as 
it'(W) = 1t(W) if(!) E (p) and 1t'(W) < l -a 
= I if we [p] and n(w) = 1 -a 
= n'(w) == 0 otherwise. 
Hence it'= n(- I [p]), the result of revising 1t by [p] using 
the ordinal conditioning method of Section 3.1. 
The possibilistic revision rule based on ordinal 
conditioning can be expressed directly on the belief base 
� by the following method (Dubois and Prade, 1992), 
called "brutal theory base operator" by Williams(1994a) 
and then %*Pis obtained: 
i) adding p above the top layer of � 
ii) deleting all sentences whose level is below the 
inconsistency level a= inc(� u {(p 1)}). 
This belief base revision is rather drastic since all 
sentences (Pi ai) with weights ai :::; a are thrown away, 
and replaced by (p 1 ). However it is syntax-independent. 
Note that this revision method works even if the weights 
attached to formulae are not EE-coherent. Suppose (q j3) E 
� and%--- (q y) withy> p. It means that (q �) can be 
deleted from � without altering its fuzzy set of models. 
The revision being syntax-independent, the presence or the 
absence of (q �) in % will not affect the fuzzy set of 
models of �* . Note that when Il(p) > 0, N(q I p) > 0 is 
equivalent to &c..,p v q) > N(•p v •q), i.e., in terms of 
epistemic entrenchment (Gardenfors, 1988), •p v q is 
more entrenched than 'P v -.q, and corresponds to a 
characteristic condition for having q in the (ordered) belief 
set obtained by revising Cons(�) with respect to p, in 
Gardenfors (1988). We just showed that this revision is 
easily implemented in the possibilistic belief base itself, 
without making the underlying ordered belief set explicit. 
This result goes against the often encountered claim that 
working with epistemic entrenchment orderings would be 
intractable. Note that the revision produces a new 
epistemic entrenchment ordering. 
A more parsimonious revision scheme for possibilistic 
belief bases � receiving an input p is to consider all 
subsets of � that fail to infer (..,p a) for a> 0. If ;Je is 
such a subset, then the result of the revision could be 
;!e u {(p,I)}. We may take advantage of the ordering in 
� to make the selection. Namely we may restrict 
ourselves to;Je such thatV(qa)tt: ;!e,;Je u {(qa), 
(p l)} 1- (.l a) in the possibilistic logic sense, i.e., (q a) 
is involved in the contradiction. This proposal, made 
independently in Dubois et a!. ( 1992) corresponds to 
selecting a preferred subbase in the sense of Brewka 
(1989). This selection process leads to a unique solution if 
� is totally ordered. In case of ties, further refinement 
can be made using a lexicographic ordering of the weights 
of the sentences not in 3'£, as proposed in Dubois et al. 
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( 1992). These revision processes, that also relate to Nebel 
(l992)'s syntax-based revision schemes, are systematically 
studied in Benferhat et al. (1993). 
This kind of revision process cannot be expressed at the 
semantic level, where all sentences in the knowledge base 
::K. u { (p 1)} have been combined into a possibility 
distribution on n, and revision is performed on the 
aggregated possibility distribution. Especially if (q �) E 
::K. and � < inc( ::K. u { (p l)}) then min(1t, Ill 1) :::; 
max(Jl[q]• l - �). i.e., everything happens as if (q jj)bad 
never oeen in ::K.. The alternative syntactic revision rule, 
explained above, breaks the minimal inconsistent subsets 
of ::K. u { (p I)} in a parsimonious way, enabling pieces 
of evidence like (q �) to be spared when they are not 
involved in the inconsistency of ::K. u { (p l )}. 
Example: Consider the belief base ::K. 
= 
{ ( -..,p a), (q �)} 
with � < a. Then 
n(ro) 
= 
min(max(I - Jl[p] (ro), I- a), max(Jl[q](ro), I-�)) 
= I if ro F= ....,p 1\ q 
= 1 - a if ro F= p 
= 1 - � if(!) F= ....,p 1\ ....,q, 
Revising by input p at the semantic level leads to consider 
n'(ro) =
 
min(n(ro), ll[pJ(ro)) 
=
 ( 0
1 -
h
a if � F= 
p 
ot erw1se. 
Hence 1t( ro I [p]) = I if ro F= p and 0 otherwise. Hence 
::K.* P = { (p 1) }. Acting at the syntactic level, the preferred sub-base of {(p 1), (...,p a), (q �)} that contains p is {(p 1), 
(q �)}.Note that although min(n, ll[p]):::; max(Jl[q]• l­
�) we no longer have 1t(ro I [p]) � min(Jl[q](ro), 1 - �). 
i.e., adding the low certainty formulas consistent with 
::K. * P leads to a non-trivial expansion of 1t(· I [p)). It 
points out the already mentioned weakness of the semantic 
views of revision, which is particularly true with 
numerical approaches: the representation of the cognitive 
state is lumped, i.e., the pieces of belief are no longer 
available and the semantic revision process cannot account 
for the structure of the cognitive state that is made explicit 
in the ordered belief base. 
Possibilistic base revision can be extended to the case of 
uncertain inputs. This has been done by Williams (1995) 
for her so-called adjustments. We have pointed out that if 
the input information is of the form (p a), an adjustment 
is the possibilistic counterpart of Jeffrey's rule as given by 
equation (9) and * = min when the weight is positive. 
Williams (1995) gives a rather intricate recipe to achieve 
the adjustment on the belief base itself. Stated in terms of 
necessity measures, the adjustment comes down to 
computing, for all formulae q the degree 
N(q I (p a))= min (N(q I p), max( a, N(q I ...,p)). 
Here we assume that the ordering in ::K. is EE-coherent. 
For adjusting a belief base ::K. to input (p a), it is enough 
to compute ::K. * P and ::K. * ...,P using the above brutal 
syntactic revision method. Then if a formula q appears in 
:1<:.* P.or in :1<:.* •P let it ?e with respecti.ve weigh�s �+and �-.With the understandmg that the we1ght IS 0 If q does 
not appear in the corresponding belief base. The adjusted 
bel�ef �ase �*(R a) is made of.all these formulae, each of whtch IS ass1gnea the weight mm (�+,max( a, �-)). 
Possibility theory thus offers a framework where the 
connection between semantic and syntactic forms of belief 
change can be easily laid bare. 
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APPENDIX: Mapping adjustment of kappa 
functions to the possibilistic setting 
An adjustment of K by (A,n) is either a contraction �A if 
n = 0 or another belief change operation, defined by 
K*cA .n) 
where � A(w) 
= K-A if n = 0 
= (rA)x(A n) if O < n < K( A) 
= K\A,n) otherwise 
= 0 if w e  A and K(W) = K(A) 
= K(w) otherwise 
= 0 if W E  A and K(W) = K(A) 
= K(A) if either ro E  A and K(W) "# K(A) 
or w e  A and K(w) > n 
= n otherwise. 
It is obvious that K-A ( w) becomes 7C A ( w) using the 
mapping 1t(W) = 2-K(AJ, and considering the definition of 
a contraction in the possibilistic setting. Hence Williams 
contraction exactly corresponds to possibil istic 
contraction. Let us consider Kx(A n)·  The corresponding 
possibilistic rule is (noticing a =  i - 2-n) 
1t\A,a)(W) = I if w. E A and 1t(W) = IT(A) 
= 1t(W) If w e  A and n(ro) < I1(A) 
= 1t(ro) if ro e  A and n(ro) < I - a 
= 1 - a if ro e A and n(ro) ;::: l - a. 
This definition can then be simplified 
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1t\A,a/OO) = 1t(ro I A) if ro E A 
= min( l - a, n(ro)) if ro � A. 
This is the belief change operation ( 1 1 )  with * = min: this 
operation has been given a clear meaning in Section 3 .2 
since (A,n) is thus an unsure input that can be rejected if  
too uncertain. 
The adj ustment then can be expressed as follows in the 
possibilistic setting: 
1t* (A ,U) = 1t-_!. i; a = 0 
= (1t A) (A ,n) 
= 1t\A,n) 
Assume N(A) > o: > 0 .  Then: 
if O < a <  N(A) 
otherwise. 
(1t-A)\A,n)(ro) = 1t�A(ro I A) if ro e  A. 
= mm( l - a, 1t-A (ro)) If ro e: A. 
It is not difficult to check that 
i) n-A (ro I A) = 1t(ro I A). Indeed if ro � A then both 
sides are zero. If ro E A then n-A ( ro ) = n( ro )  
everywhere; 
ii) if ro e:  A then max(1t(ro), n(ro I A)) = 1t(ro I A). 
Hence n*(A,a)(ro) = n(ro I A) if ro e A_ 
= min( l - a, n(ro I A)) otherwise. 
Assume now N(A) :5 a; then, as stated above, n*(A,u) = 
1t\A ,u) · But since N(A) :5 o: ,  I1(A) ;?: 1 - a , so when 
ro � A 
if 1t(ro) < I - a  then n(ro I A) = n(ro) 
if 1t(ro) = 1 - a  then n(ro I A) ;::: 1 - a 
hence min( I - a, 1t(ro)) = min(1 - a, 1t(ro I A)) for ro e: 
A. It becomes clear that 1t* (A,a) takes the same form 
whether N(A) > a or not and coincides with the 
counterpart of Jeffrey's rule in the possibilistic setting, 
that is, rule (9) with * = min. Note that it can be written 
in the form of a qualitative mixture (Dubois et al., 1993), 
very similar to Jeffrey's rule, when a > 0 
1t*(A,u)(ro) = max(1t(ro I A), min( 1 - a, n(ro I A)). 
This leads us to simplifying the expression of Williams 
adjustment into 
K*(A,n/ro) = min(lC*(ro I A), max(n, JC*(ro I A)) (12) 
where K*(ro I A) = +oo if ro � A 
= JC(ro) if K(ro) > K(A) 
= 0 if K(ro) = lC(A) 
using the mappings 1t(ro) = 2-K(ro) and a =  1 - 2n . This 
is equation ( 1 2) of the main text. The latter is the 
Spohnian version of the qualitative form of possibilistic 
conditioning. Turning K*(ro I A) into K(W I A) = K(ro) ­
K(A) when ro e A and max into sum, one gets the 
Spohnian (A,n)-conditioning rule. Note that when n = 0, 
K* ( A ,n) as per ( 1 2) does not recover .the con�r�c.ti�n K-A , exactly for the same reason as tts possibihstic 
counterpart (9). See the corresponding discussion. It seems 
somewhat artificial to enforce K* (A,n) = r A when n = 0 ,  as done by Williams ( 1994b). 
